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SOME ST. LOUTS CASE LAW.*
We hear much of the use of cases to supplement the study
of law books; cases are a sort of legal clinic, or laboratory,
where practical application can be had of the principles
learned in books. Much of the value of the case system is be-
cause of the fact that actual situations in actual locations are
more readily understood and remembered than are ponderous
abstractions. This being true, it will follow that if the states
of facts concern scenes that are familiar to us from daily asso-
ciation, their value as concrete examples is just that much
greater.
We little think as we ride about St. Louis thatmany of the
scenes at which we look in a rather indifferent manner were
the locations on which were staged legal conflicts whose deci-
sion by the higher courts has become part of our corpus juris.
1. Lindell Boulevard brings to mind two rather celebrated
suits-one about the Lindell and the other about the Boule-
vard. The farm through the center of which a street was dedi-
cated by the Lindell heirs, was originally owned by one Sam-
*By McCune Gill, Vice-President and Attorney, Title Gu.ranty Trust
Company, St. Louis, Mo.
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uel Hammond. He became financially embarrassed and his
farm was sold at an execution sale, and a sheriff's deed duly
delivered. The sheriff's acknowledgment was taken in due
form by the Clerk of the Circuit Court, and properly endorsed
upon the deed, except for one mistake-the seal of the court
was not impressed thereon. Afterward Peter Lindell, a prom-
inent merchant of ante bellum days, bought the farm and used
it as such during the time when St. Louis was growing from
Twelfth street toward Grand Boulevard. By the sixties the
city had almost reached that goal, Lindell's Grove, at what is
now Theresa avenue and Olive street, being used as a soldiers'
camping ground, the famous Camp Jackson. During all this
time the Hammond heirs were content to allow Lindell to pay
the taxes on the land. Shortly after the war, however, Lin-
dell's heirs were about to subdivide the tract into residence
lots and the Hammonds brought suit on the supposedly defec-
tive deed, basing their contention upon the well-known and
barbarous Missouri rule that an official deed is absolutely void
and not merely defective as to record, notice, and evidence, if
the acknowledgment be incorrect. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, turned a deaf ear to this plea and in the case of Ham-
mond v. Gordon,' held that the affixing of the seal would be
presumed and the deed was held valid; although this decision
was not rendered until many of the owners had bought off the
claimants rather than engage in a protracted legal battle that
would ruin the chance of an immediate sale of the ground.
2. The Boulevard cases so called are City of St. Louis v.
Hill,2 and City of St. Louis v. Dorr,8 and were the result of an
attempt to impose by ordinance a building line and other re-
strictions upon certain streets to be called boulevards, includ-
ing Lindell avenue. No suit was brought nor any service had
upon the abutting owners, nor were any damages allowed to
1. 93 Mo. 223, 150 S. W. 633.
2. 116 Mo. ,27.
3. 145 Mo. 466.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss2/1
SOME ST. LOUIS CASE LAW
those whose lots would be of smaller value after the change.
Such a condition was shown to exist particularly with refer-
ence to corner lots which were more valuable without the re-
strictions than with them. The Court consequently held that
this was an appropriation without just compensation and
without due process of law and hence was void, and particu-
larly held that "the use of property is property."
3. The title to the Des Peres valley, now the site of the
golf links in Forest Park and the residence section north of
the park, is derived by mesne conveyances from Madame
Papin, who originally obtained a concession or permission to
settle from the Spanish Government, which concession was
later confirmed. Another concession had, however, been pre-
viously issued for part of this land to one Chauvin, and said
Chauvin asserted that his prior claim should be confirmed.
But the Board of Conunissioners decided that the first con-
firmation was final even though there was a prior outstanding
concession. This same conclusion was also reached by the
United States Supreme Court in the cases of Chouteau v.
Eckert,4 Mackay v. Dillon,5 and Les Bois v. Bramell. 6 The
clainmants under the Chauvin concession being thus disap-
pointed, then attempted to re-locate the claim east of the Papin
tract, or extending from the present Union avenue to about
Taylor avenue. Here they would encounter only New Madrid
titles to which their concession would be superior. But this
ingenious theory did not meet with the approval of the Gov-
ernment, and so the notorious Chauvin claim became a bursted
bubble.
4. Another case in the same neighborhood concerned the
ground on the south side of West Pine Boulevard from Taylor
avenue to Euclid avenue. This property was owned by the
Rex Realty Company which sold off several lots and imposed
4. 2 Howard 34.
5. 4 Howard 421.
6. 4 Howard 449.
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rather stringent building restrictions thereon, covenanting in
each dped tq place similar restrictions on all other lots in the
tract that phojld be sold in the future. Soon they found them-
selves with oply a few lots -n hand and with a very tempting
offer for those lots if they could be sold unrestricted. This
thoy 43i4 and the purchaser found that he had bought a lawsuit
along with his lots, for the earlier purchasers demanded that
he abide by the restribtions, even though they were not a part
of hip deed, nor of any deed in his entire chain of title. He
,pointed out that surely a prospective purchaser need not ex-
amiii.o all the deeds made by all the former owners of his lot,
to aagertain whether such owners had in any of their deeds
(wiAh plight he very numerous) bound themselves to restrict
the tract out of which his lot was to be carved, perhaps many
years later. But the Court did not agree with him and held
the; restrictiops binding in the case of King v. St. Louis Union
Trust. Co.
5. Along Cook avenue, from Taylor avenue to Grand,
there originally stretched one of the long narrow farms that
the French called'common fields. Although this tract was sub-
divided and sold as building lots a half century ago (and some
of them are ready to be built on again), a defect was recently
discovered that gave rise to the suit of Chaput v. Bock et al.8
This case never got to a trial on its merits, because of the
"et a." among the defendants. The plaintiffs joined all of
the many owners of lots as defendants in one suit, on the
theory. that the action had arisen from one transaction. It was
held, however, that even under modern codes of procedure an
ejectment suit brought against different owners of several
tracts is multifarious and void,. even though the basis of the
suit-wa8 something that occurred when the tract was all owned
by oAe person.
7. 226 Mo. 351.
8. 224 Mo. 73.
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6. Farther south on Grand avenue (or boulevard, as it is
now called), one crosses the large bridge spanning the rail-
roads that occupy the bed of the former Mill Creek. The build-
ing of this bridge gave rise to a valuable decision in the law of
contracts. It seems that the oompany that had contracted to
furnish the iron work for the bridge did not have the iron
ready to deliver on the agreed date. The city sued the com-
pany for damages, which claim was resisted on the plea that
even though the iron had been ready as stipulated in the con-
tract, it could not have been installed as the city did not have
the abutments in place at that time. And in this case the prin-
ciple was laid down that non-performance of a contract ig ex-
cused when performance is prevented by the acts or neglect of
the other party.
7. A little farther south on Grand one comes to a tract just
south of Neosho street over which a legal battle was waged in-
volving some questions as to powers, limitations, and accrual
of causes of action. This property was conveyed to a trustee
for the sole and separate use of a married woman. This was
prior to the passage of the Married Women's Separate Prop-
erty Act of 1889, and at that time a great deal of property was
thus held in trust for married women so as to create for them
equitable separate estates and secure the benefit of the liberal
views of courts of equity. Practically all of such conveyances
in trust provided that the trustee could sell at the request of
the woman at any time during her life. The deed conveying
the Grand avenue property seemed to be in the customary
form and was so considered by all concerned and a deed was
obtained from the trustee and the lady in the case. But it was
subsequently discovered that the original conveyance in trust
gave power to sell only during the lifetime of the- husband and
not of the wife, or life tenant, the deed from her being exe-
cuted several years after the husband's" death. The heirs
promptly brought suit against the new owners, but were just
as promptly dismissed out of court, because they were held to
have no right of possession during the life of the life tenant,
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and hence their cause of action had not yet accrued. They
were thus compelled to wait, more or less patiently until the
life tenant died, but suffered no lapse of memory concerning
the facts or principles involved, and upon the death of such
life tenant they immediately brought another suit. The occu-
pant then pleaded 1initation but, of course, last this point, as
no limitation could run during the life estate. The case was
later compromised and deeds obtained from the now vic-
torious remaindermen. The case in the Supreme Court is
McDonald v. Quick."
8. At the extreme end of Grand avenue we look across the
River des Peres toward the line of hills to the south. These
hills were once claimed by General Grant's father-in-law,
Frederick Dent, who had acquired by mesne conveyances
from a French settler who held adversely to the claim of the
Village of Carondelet to the vast area known as the Carondelet
Commons. This case went to the United States Supreme
Court, which decided against the President's wife's father,
and held that possessions within commons are void unless they
were confirmed prior to the taking effect of the Act of Con-
gres of 1812, granting to all French towns the title to their
adjacent commons. This case is known as Dent v. Emmegger.0
9. Another famous ease in South St. Louis has to do with
the Sublette family. The plot of this litigation is melodra-
matic enough to have been the basis of an old fashioned dime
novel-will, "cheeild," gravestone, poison and everything. It
would make a wonderful modern serial movie. It seems that
one William L. Sublette was a prominent merchant and trader
here in the early thirties. He married Frances Hereford and
purchased a farm or country home about five miles from town
on the road to Manchester. This farm now extends along the
west side of Kingshighway from the Frisco tracks to South-
9. 139 Mo. 484.
10. 14 Wallace 308.
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vest avenue. William died childless and devised the east half
of his farm to his wife. She then married Solomon P. Sub-
lette, brother of William, and conveyed to him the north half
-of her portion. Three children were borm to them, but all died
early in life, the last, Esther, dying rather mysteriously after
a birthday party given by her maternal relatives. As neither
Nolomon nor Frances had left wills, the farm had descended
to little Esther and when she died the property passed by
descent to her Hereford relatives, the only Sublette relations
being too far removed. After the title had rested in the Here-
fords and their grantees for thirty years, two startling things
happened. One was the finding, or alleged finding, of the
bones of Pinekney W. Sublette, uncle of Esther, and of his
gravestone marked with the date 1865. The place of this find
was a lonely gulch in Wyoming which fitted in well with the
fact that Pilckney was a trader with the Indians and died in
the West. If the date were authentic he would have survived
Esther Sublette and become heir to an eighth of her estate and
numerous Sublettes would inherit from him. About the time
of this find an ancient paper purporting to be the will of Solo-
mon P. Sublette was mailed on a train near Kansas City.
This document purported to devise all of the testator's prop-
erty to his Sublette relatives. From these two events two
suits arose. One was an ejectment for the eighth of Pinckney
Sublette. His alleged bones and gravestone were brought
here as Exhibit A and reposed in the court house file room
for many years. The question of the authenticity of these
gruesome relics was never decided, as the Supreme Court in
the case of Peniston v. Schlude" decided against the plaintiffs
on the remarkable theory that there were probably two Pinck-
ney Sublettes. The other suit prays for the establishment of
the will of Solomon Sublette, and a person was found who
testified that he was one of the witnesses thereto. The pro-
ponents are confronted, however, with several hundred letters
11. 171 Mo. 132.
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written by Solomon to his wife, Frances, while he was on trips;
to the then wild West, and the signatures on all of these are
almost exactly alike, but none resemble the signature on the
wAill.
10. In the northern part of the city the student of case
law finds some interesting local color. As one stands upon
the high bluff or hill that forms the eastern part of O'Fallon
Park, one looks out across a wide stretch of flat bottom land
extending eastwardly to the river. This tract was the basis
of a case involving the familiar principle that the part of a
descript'rn in a deed that recites the distances will be subor-
dinate to the monuments given if the two calls are in conflict.
It seems that in an early deed part of this low land was de-
scribed as fronting on the River Gingrass (a creek paralleling
the Mississippi River) by a depth of twenty arpents to the
hills. The "hills" are now O'Fallon Park, but are more than
twenty arpents from Gingrass Creek. It was held in Clamor-
gan v, Railway12 that the hills being a monument wete supe-
rior to the distance and that the deed conveyed to the hills.
IL To the south of this, along Broadway, there lies a tract
formerly known as North, St. Louis, which is a subdivision of
a large concession of several hundred acres extending down
to the Mississippi from Chambers street to St. Louis avenue.
That is, everyone supposed the tract extended to the Missis-
sippi until the Supreme Court in a most remarkable decision
in the case of Sweringen v. City of St. Louis 13 disillusioned
us. This was a simple looking action to divest the City of any
rights it might have in some "paper" streets that had seldom
or never been used as highways. One of the city's defenses
was that even though the streets had been abandoned, Mrs.
Sweringen would not own them, as they were situated on
accretions to the original bank and that the acere-
12. 72 Mo. 139.
13. 151 Mo. 348.
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tions did not belong to the bank owner because cer-
tain deeds described the property as bounded east by
a meandered line by courses and distances along the
bank of the river, but not specifically bounded by the river.
The Court inclined to this view and held against Mrs. Swerin-
gen. This decided the street case but opened up the question
as to who did own the accretions if the bank owners did not.
From this resulted a suit by the Board of Education of the
City of St. Louis, laying claim to such accretions under the
Act of the Missouri Legislature of 1895, which granted all
islands formed since 1820 to the adjacent county for the use
of the schools. The theory was that if the accretions were not
such in legal contemplation that they must constitute an island
although they had always been firmly attached to the bank.
This case was promptly decided against the school board in
the local court below, however, and the suit was then dropped
because of popular disfavor from the fact that a decision
favorable to the school board would result in dispossessing
many owners who had been there for many years.
12. In the downtown district an interesting case is Stroth-
er v. Lucas. 14 Judge Lucas had bought several French con-
cessions extending from the then city limits at Third street to
the site of the old commons fields fence along whose line Jef-
ferson avenue now runs. The tract's side lines were the Rue
Bonhomme or Market street on the south and the Rue St.
Charles or St. Charles street on the north. Lucas obtained a
confirmation of these tracts to himself from the board ap-
pointed by the United States Government. Strother in the
meantime had bought up the adverse claims of several French-
men to some of these tracts, and was prepared to show that
his grantors had the best and only valid concession and that
the confirmation should have been to them and not to Lucas.
The Supreme Court of the United States, suffering from en-
nui, no doubt, because of the maze of contention and counter'-
14. 14 Peters (U. S.) 410.
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contention growing out of these and similar claims, held that
the complete legal title passed from the United States upon
confirmation by the proper authorities, and that such con-
firmation, right or wrong, was final.
13. Another case just over in the county helped to estab-
lish an important point in the law of wills and deeds. The
Gannon family owned a tract just north of Clayton, and the
will of their ancestor devised part of it to one of the devisees
"and his heirs." The word "heirs" had been rendered un-
necessary by statute many years before, so far as a fee simple
was concerned. It was contended in this case, theref ore, that
as the word "heirs" was not needed to create a fee it should
be construed to create either a remainder or a tenancy in com-
mon. This theory did not appeal to the Supreme Court, which
held in Gannon v. Albright,r and Gannon v. Pauck,'0 that the
use of the now superfluous words does not change the former
rule that a fee simple is created.
14. Two cases involving a hair-splitting distinction be-
tween general and special warranties are Tracy v. Greffet,1 7
and Miller and Bayless. " ' Both of the deeds contained the
words of the statutory warranty, "Grant, Bargain and Sell,"
and both attempted to limit the warranty clause to claims by,
through or under the gTantor, but no others. And yet in the
first case it was held that the deed was a general warranty and
in the second a special warranty. Julius Greffet, the St. Louis
real estate agent, who was the defendant in the first case, was
very careful after this decision to cross out the "Grant" in
our mysterious formula of words of conveyance.
15. On the northeast corner of Broadway and Geyer ave-
nue there stands a building which is a monument to the inabil-
15. 183 Mo. 238.
16. 183 Mo. 265.
17. 54 Mo. App. 562.
18. 194 Mo. 630.
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ity of courts to cope with unusual conditions of fact. This
building lay in the path of the tornado of 1896, which rather
unceremoniously removed the top half of it. The owner im-
mediately contracted for the repair or rebuilding of the prem-
ises, but died shortly thereafter. He left several minor chil-
dren. A guardian was appointed and asked the Probate Court
for an order to execute a deed of trust on the property to raise
money to make the house tenantable. This order was granted,
and the money properly expended. Some years later, after the
children had grown up, they allowed the mortgage to default,
and it was foreclosed. They resisted the purchaser's title on
the plea that there was no statutory authority for the order
that the Probate Court had made. The Supreme Court in the
case of 1Valdermeyer v. Loebig' 9 agreed with this contention,
and also denied the request of the purchaser that he be subro-
gated to the lien that the mechanic would have enforced if he
had not been paid. The Court apologized to the purchaser for
taking his money from him, and suggested that some future
legislature pass an act adjusting the relations of cyclones and
guardians. This suggestion has, of course, been entirely ig-
nored by all subsequent legislatures, which leads us to remark
that judicial legislation, bad as it is, is better than none.
16. The southwest corner of Ninth street and Washington
avenue, just across from the Statler Hotel, is of sufficient
value to have been in the Supreme Court twice within the last
few years. One Theresa Bernero owned the property. She
had adopted as her son Emanuel C. Bernero. He had prede-
ceased her leaving his son Louis Bernero. Theresa, whom we
may call the adoptive grandmother, left a will giving to Louis
a small legacy, but no interest in this real estate. The ques-
tion arose as to whether the child of an adopted son is the
heir of the grandmother. The case was very carefully briefed,
with citations all the way back to the Code of Hammurabi
19. 183 Mo. 363.
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First, KCing of Babylon in the year 2250 B. C. The Court in
Bernero v. Goodwin 20 held Louis to be an heir under our stat-
ute. Then a further question arose as to whether he was an
heir under a remainder to "heirs" in the will, and this was
decided in the negative, in Bernero v. Trust Co.21 And so
Theresa's grudge against her grandson by adoption (which
was supposed to have arisen because of religious differences
between her and the boy's mother) was put into effect.
20. 267 Mo. 427.
21. 230 S. W. 620.
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